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DIVORCE PLANNING IN ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS:
TOWARD A NEW OBJECTIVITY
Peter Nash Swisher*
I. INTRODUCTION
Within the past fifty years, there have been numerous articles
written about the validity and enforceability of antenuptial agree-
ments.' Such agreements are generally favored by the law when
prospective spouses privately contract to vary, limit, or relinquish
certain rights which they would otherwise acquire in each other's
property or in each other's estate by reason of their impending mar-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law; Member, California
and Virginia State Bars; B.A., Amherst College, 1966; M.A., Stanford University, 1967; J.D.,
University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 1973.
1. See I. BAXTER, MARITAL PROPERTY §§ 25:1-26:6 (1973); H. CLARK, LAW OF DoMESTIc
RELATIONS 27-31 (1968) [hereinafter cited as CLARK]; A. LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS
AND ANTE-NuPTIAL CoNTRACTs § 90 (1977 ed.) [hereinafter cited as LINDEY]; Branca & Stein-
berg, Antenuptial Agreements under California Law, 11 U.S.F.L. REV. 317 (1977); Cathey,
Ante-Nuptial Agreements in Arkansas-A Drafter's Problem, 24 ARK. L. REv. 275 (1970);
Funk, Antenuptial Contracts Concerning Property Settlements, 33 Ky. L. J. 197 (1945);
Gamble, The Antenuptial Contract, 26 U. MIAMI L. REv. 692 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Gamble]; Klein, A "Check List" for the Drafting of Enforceable Antenuptial Agreements,
19 U. MIAMI L. REv. 615 (1965); Merritt, Changing Marital Rights and Duties by Contract:
Legal Obstacles in North Carolina, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 85 (1977); Wolsen, Husband and
Wife-Antenuptial Contracts, 41 MIcH. L. REv. 1133 (1943); Note, The Validity of Antenup-
tial Agreements Which Limit the Property Rights of the Parties, Particularly as They Pertain
to Divorce, 31-B.U.L. REv. 92 (1951); Note, Equity and the Antenuptial Agreement, 6 CArd.
U. L. REv. 169 (1957); Note, Antenuptial Agreements in Pennsylvania, 55 DICK. L. REv. 382
(1951); See also Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 1403 (1972); Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 370 (1967); Annot., 80
A.L.R.2d 941 (1961); Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 942 (1958); Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 1419 (1953);
Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 1178, 1259 (1948); Annot., 164 A.L.R. 1236 (1946); Annot., 98 A.L.R. 533
(1935); Annot., 70 A.L.R. 826 (1931).
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riage.2 Traditionally, this antenuptial agreement is typically made
by older people who are about to be remarried, and who have ac-
quired considerable property from a prior marriage that they wish
to control.3
However, unless the antenuptial agreement provisions fall
squarely within this rather limited parameter, there is a good
chance that a court may declare the antenuptial agreement to be
illegal and void as against public policy, especially if the agreement
has included any antenuptial contingency planning in case of a later
divorce or marital separation.
In fact, judicial attitudes toward many antenuptial agreements
have become so unpredictable and indefinite, that widespread and
consistent use of the antenuptial agreement has traditionally been
precluded in any form other than to settle the disposition of prop-
erty and estate rights on the death of one or both of the spouses.'
Within this general framework of what does and does not consti-
tute a valid antenuptial agreement, any divorce-planning provisions
in antenuptial agreements, until very recently, have almost always
been held by American courts to be void as contrary to a rigid
"public policy" rule, purportedly upholding the status of marriage
by preventing the parties from contracting a private agreement
which would facilitate a future divorce or legal separation.5
The legal rationale behind this "public policy" rule, though sel-
dom clearly articulated in the cases, may be summarized under one
of two major assumptions:
(1) Antenuptial agreements which include provisions related to
the possibility of divorce tend to "promote" or "encourage" that
divorce; or
(2) Certain duties incident to marriage, such as alimony or
spousal support and maintenance, are of such public importance
2. Such provisions might include: release of the distributive shares in each other's estate;
the mutual bar of dower and curtesy rights; the surrender of the right of election to take
against the other's estate; and the transfer of money or property to the other, either before
the marriage or after. See LINDEY, supra note 1, at § 90-26.
3. CLARK, supra note 1, at 27.
4. See LINDEY, supra note 1, at § 90; CLARK, supra note 1, at 28-30; and Gamble, supra
note 1, at 693.
5. See LiNDEY, supra note 1, at §§ 90-71 to 74; and CLARK, supra note 1, at 28-31.
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that they cannot be left to the parties' private contractual control
in an antenuptial agreement.
This article will analyze these two "public policy" rules by using
examples of various judicial decisions to test each rule by its legal
rationale and public policy justification; it will demonstrate through
these examples that a traditional judicial subjectivity has often
misinterpreted and misapplied these rules; and it will conclude that
divorce-planning in antenuptial agreements is a realistic and objec-
tive legal concept whose time has come.
11. Do CONTINGENT DIVORCE-PLANNING PROVISIONS IN ANTENUPTIAL
AGREEMENTS ACTUALLY "ENCOURAGE" OR "PROMOTE" DIVORCE Per
Se?
A. The Traditional Rule
Until very recently, it was almost a universal "public policy" rule
in every American jurisdiction, except possibly one,' that antenup-
tial agreements which attempt to govern the rights and duties of the
parties on divorce 7 are invalid. This "public policy" rule, stated by
numerous authorities, is that:
any antenuptial contract which provides for, facilitates, or tends to
induce, a separation or divorce of the parties after marriage, is con-
trary to public policy, and is therefore void. It has often been held
that an antenuptial agreement limiting the liability of the husband
to the wife [or vice versa] for alimony, or fixing the property rights
of the parties, in the event of a separation or divorce, is void.,
This has been the general rule in most jurisdictions.?
6. Hudson v. Hudson, 350 P.2d 596 (Okla. 1960).
7. Such contingent divorce-planning provisions might include the following examples: lim-
iting or relinquishing the property rights of the respective spouses on separation or divorce;
limiting or relinquishing the obligation for spousal support on separation or divorce; and
limiting any spousal support or property rights on separation or divorce to a certain stipulated
amount of money. See LINDEY, supra note 1, at §§ 90-73-4; Gamble, supra note 1, at 703-04
n. 46.
8. Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn. App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288, 293 (1964) (quoting 17 Am. JuR.
Divorce and Separation § 16 (1957)). See also Annot., 70 A.L.R. 826 (1931); Annot., 57
A.L.R.2d 942 (1958).
9. Williams v. Williams, 29 Ariz. 538, 243 P. 402 (1926); Oliphant v. Oliphant, 177 Ark.
613, 7 S.W.2d 783 (1928); Ellis v. Comm'r. of Int. Rev., 437 F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1971) (applying
Ariz. law); Daniel v. Daniel, 222 Ga. 861, 152 S.E.2d 873 (1967); Watson v. Watson, 37 Ind.
1979]
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Admittedly, such a "public policy" rule may have merit in pro-
tecting and promoting the status of marriage, which creates "the
most important relation in life, as having more to do with the morals
and civilization of a people than any other institution."''
Yet, although the rule itself may have merit, the judicial
application of this rule has often been ignored or misconstrued by
most courts. In practice, this can mean that whenever property or
support provisions related to divorce are mentioned in an antenup-
tial agreement, most courts will take one of two approaches: first,
they may automatically invalidate any divorce contingency provi-
sion or invalidate the entire agreement without attempting to deter-
mine whether or not such provisions actually do "encourage" or
"promote" divorce under a particular fact situation; or, second,
those courts which do at least discuss the rationale behind this
"public policy" rule, tend to interpret the rule by a rather subjective
judicial standard-discussing what might happen to "encourage" or
"promote" divorce-rather than basing their decision on the actual
intent of the parties, or on the objective terms of the specific con-
tract itself."
An example of the first approach is the case of In re Marriage of
Gudenkauf, 12 where the Supreme Court of Iowa stated that it had
"no choice" but to hold an antenuptial agreement limiting the
amount of alimony on divorce to be invalid per se. "[Sluch a provi-
sion may tend to facilitate or induce dissolution of the marriage,"
the court noted, even though the husband argued that "it did not
App. 548, 77 N.E. 355 (1906); In re Marriage of Gudenkauf, 204 N.W.2d 586 (Iowa, 1973);
Fincham v. Fincham, 160 Kan. 683, 165 P.2d 209, modified on other grounds, 161 Kan. 753,
173 P.2d 244 (1946); Ranney v. Ranney, 219 Kan. 428, 548 P.2d 734 (1976); Stratton v. Wilson,
170 Ky. 61, 185 S.W. 522 (1916); Hilbert v. Hilbert, 168 Md. 364, 177 A. 914 (1935); Cohn v.
Cohn, 209 Md. 470, 121 A.2d 704 (1956); In re Estate of Muxlow, 367 Mich. 133, 116 N.W.2d
43 (1962); Englund v. Englund, 286 Minn. 157,175 N.W.2d 461 (1970); Stefonick v. Stefonick,
118 Mont. 486, 167 P.2d 848 (1946); Motley v. Motley, 255 N.C. 190, 120 S.E.2d 422 (1961);
Dearbaugh v. Dearbaugh, 110 Ohio App. 540, 170 N.E.2d 262 (1959); Reiling v. Reiling, 256
Or. 448, 474 P.2d 327 (1970); Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn. App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288 (1964);
Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124, 43 N.W.2d 500 (1950); Werlein v. Werlein, 27 Wis.2d 237, 133
N.W.2d 820 (1965); Cumming v. Cumming, 127 Va. 16, 102 S.E. 572 (1920). But see Capps
v. Capps, 216 Va. 378, 219 S.E.2d 901 (1975); and Friedlander v. Friedlander, 80 Wash.2d
293, 494 P.2d 208 (1972).
10. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
11. See generally the authority cited in note 9, supra. But see the authority cited in note
14, infra.
12. 204 N.W.2d 586 (Iowa, 1973).
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have that effect in this marriage." Nevertheless, declared the Iowa
Supreme Court, "Itihe policy which invalidates antenuptial prohi-
bitions of alimony does not depend upon the result in a given case.
It operates ab initio to avoid such provisions in every case, 13 appar-
ently without regard to any objective analysis, or without reference
to the parties' objective intent under general contract law.'4
In regard to the second approach-that of a subjective judicial
standard to determine whether or not an antenuptial agreement
"might" encourage or promote divorce-a leading Wisconsin deci-
sion, Fricke v. Fricke,'5 aptly demonstrates how inadequate this
subjective test really is.
In this particular case, Gustav, aged 62, contemplated marriage
to Elizabeth, aged 56, who had been his housekeeper for 13 years.
Prior to the marriage, the parties voluntarily entered into an anten-
uptial agreement which provided that if the marriage were termi-
nated at any time "by divorce or legal proceedings," Elizabeth
would then receive $2,000 as "a full and final property settlement"
and also "in lieu of any right to alimony." The parties were married
for five years, at which time Elizabeth brought an action for divorce
against Gustav. Elizabeth also asked the court to set aside the par-
ties' antenuptial agreement as void."6 The lower court held the an-
tenuptial agreement with its divorce contingency provisions was
valid, but on appeal the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, holding
such an agreement was invalid per se.
In its decision holding the divorce-planning provisions to be void
13. Id. at 587 (emphasis added). See also Hilbert v. Hilbert, 168 Md. 364, 177 A. 914 (1935)
(in this case although a mutual waiver ;f alimony in an antenuptial agreement was not
contested, the court still declared that "such contracts are held to be void as against public
policy." Id. at 919); In re Estate of Muxlow, 367 Mich. 133, 116 N.W.2d 43 (1962) ("Had one
of the parties to the [antenuptial] agreement sought divorce, the chancellor would not have
been bound by anything in the agreement." Id. at 46).
14. See, e.g., 1 A. CORBIN, CoNTRAcTS § 106 (1963) ("In the process of making a contract,
the actual and proved intent of either of the parties should not be disregarded, unless he
knowingly or negligently has misled another person to his injury." Id.) (emphasis added);
SIMPSON, CONTRACTS § 102 (1965) ("The cardinal or fundamental rule of interpretation of
contracts, to which all others are subordinate, is that a contract could receive that interpreta-
tion which will best effectuate the intention of the parties." Id.); Williston on Contracts §§
601, 610A (3rd ed. W. Jaeger 1961); and authority cited therein.
15. Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124, 42 N.W.2d 500 (1950).
16. Id. at 500.
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as against public policy, the court stated its traditional "public
policy" argument in this manner:
The court should not look with favor upon an agreement which may
tend to permit a reservation in the mind of the husband when he
assumes the responsibility of maintaining his spouse in such comfort
as he is able to provide and until his death or the law relieves him of
it. ,7
Arguing that a husband "cannot shirk," "even by contract," from
the requirement of supporting his wife or ex-wife, the Fricke court
stated in summary:
We conclude that an antenuptial contract which purports to limit
the husband's liability in the event of separation or divorce, regard-
less of the circumstances motivating its adoption or those attending
its execution is void as against public policy.'
So the Fricke court, in its concern for upholding certain public
policy principles per se, had turned a deaf ear to the question of
whether or not these principles applied to the particular facts of a
given agreement based upon the objective intent of the parties.
Instead, the court subjectively stated that these principles "may"
be affected, but "regardless of the circumstances"' 9 such an agree-
ment would be void ab initio.
A persuasive dissent by Justice Brown in the Fricke case ques-
tioned the rationale behind this majority opinion-that divorce con-
tingency provisions in an antenuptial agreement "may" promote or
encourage divorce:
lIlt seems to be taken as a fact that if the parties know what the
husband must give and the wife will get as a result of divorce
[through an antenuptial agreement, then] one of them will be stimu-
lated to misconduct or to an effort to be rid of the spouse. How this
is known I cannot tell, and I doubt if it is so, but if it be true then it
seems self-evident that a contract which so encourages one necessar-
ily deters the other.2"
17. Id. at 501 (emphasis added).
18. Id. at 502.
19. Id. at 503 (dissenting opinion).
20. Id. (emphasis added).
[Vol. 13:175
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Here then was an equally valid counter-argument-that a divorce
contingency provision in an antenuptial agreement might "promote
and encourage" the marriage just as strongly as it might subjec-
tively "promote divorce."
For example, Justice Brown hypothesized about a marriage where
the wife was "at fault," but the husband desired to preserve the
marriage because of an overly-extravagant antenuptial agreement
in the wife's favor; or the additional example of a wife with substan-
tial property of her own, and adequate support.21 Shouldn't the
validity or non-validity of any divorce contingency provisions be
based on an objective case-by-case analysis?
Yet the facts of this case were that both parties had voluntarily
signed the agreement, that there was no evidence of fraud or duress
in the contract, and that Gustav and Elizabeth would never have
been married had not an antenuptial agreement been signed by the
parties in the first place.2 Nevertheless, Justice Brown's reasoned
dissent could not sway the Wisconsin court in two later decisions.2
Another example of judicial disfavor toward divorce-planning
contingencies in antenuptial agreements appears in a California
case, In re Marriage of Higgason,24 which was a reverse situation of
the Fricke case, and which dealt with a wife who owned substantial
property of her own.
In Higgason, at the time of the marriage, Lolita was 73 years old
and William was 48. The wife was a woman with substantial assets,
and the husband at the time of the marriage was a waiter, earning
$2 an hour plus tips, and had little or no means.
21. Id.
22. "The [Fricke] marriage had a chance to succeed and the contract is not shown to have
been responsible for its failure. Without the contract there would have been no marriage at
all. Public policy does not require that an elderly woman desiring marriage must remain
single if she cannot find a man who is willing to leave everything to chance and put his
property at the disposal of the court, if someday a court thinks it proper to grant a divorce
... " Id. at 504 (dissenting opinion).
23. See Stranberg v. Stranberg, 33 Wis.2d 204, 147 N.W.2d 349 (1967). But see. Caldwell
v. Caldwell, 5 Wis.2d 146, 92 N.W.2d 356, 361 (1958) ("While some members of the court as
now constituted would prefer the views expressed in [Justice Brown's] dissent [in Fricke v.
Fricke] if the mnatter were an original proposition, we do not consider ourselves at liberty to
reject the considered decision of our predecessors ... ") Query: Why not? Must questiona-
ble legal precedent be preserved at all costs?
24. 10 Cal.3d 476, 516 P.2d 289, 110 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1973).
1979]
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A few days prior to the marriage the parties entered into an anten-
uptial agreement which provided in part: "Each party hereto waives
and releases and renounces any and all interest pesent or future in
or to any and all the properties real and personal of the other party
. . . . and all right for contribution to the support, maintenance
and expenses of the other party. 25 Again, as in the Fricke case,
there was more than a mere suggestion that this marriage would not
have been entered into but for the antenuptial agreement.
Two weeks after the marriage, Lolita was adjudged an incompe-
tent, and a conservator was appointed. After two separate suits for
annulment and dissolution of the marriage were filed and dismissed,
Lolita instituted a final suit for the dissolution of-her marriage.
In his response to Lolita's petition to dissolve the marriage, Wil-
liam requested spousal support of $2,425 a month, attorneys fees,
and property rights "as provided by law.12 Lolita's attorney, how-
ever, argued that William was precluded from these requests by
reason of the parties' antenuptial agreement.
The California Supreme Court in this case held that William was
entitled to spousal support 7 from Lolita despite the parties' objec-
tive intent in their antenuptial agreement which stated otherwise.
Said the court:
Antenuptial agreements .... must be made in contemplation
that the marriage relation will continue until the parties are sepa-
rated by death. Contracts which facilitate divorce or separation by
providing for a settlement only in the event of such an occurrence are
void as against public policy.2
Here, then, was the farthest-reaching application of the tradi-
25. Id. at 898.
26. Id. at 900.
27. Alimony or spousal support and maintenance may be awarded to either husband or
wife, as the needs and abilities of the parties dictate, in the following states; Alaska, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Indiana, Kan-
sas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Ne-
braska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Vir-
ginia, and Wisconsin. T. BAXTER, MAIUTAL PROPERTY, Appendix "Alimony, Maintenance, and
Property Division" (Supp. 1977).
28. 110 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
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tional "public policy" rule. The California court in Higgason held
that such an agreement regarding spousal support was void not only
because it "might" subjectively promote divorce, but because an-
tenuptial agreements must contemplate that the marriage will con-
tinue "until the parties are separated by death."" Hence, this is an
almost insurmountable obstacle for a woman of substantial means
who might desire to protect her assets from an impoverished, though
upwardly-mobile, spouse. The holding of this case was disapproved,
however, in a subsequent decision."
The courts following this traditional "public policy" rule regard-
ing divorce planning in antenuptial agreements have therefore de-
clared such agreements to be void ab initio, making no attempt to
ascertain the particular fact situation in question. In so doing, they
have demonstrated a highly subjective analysis of what might hap-
pen to the parties, rather than making a judicial determination of
the parties' actual intent in drafting such an agreement.
B. The Modern Approach
Beginning in 1970 with the landmark Florida decision of Posner
v. Posner,31 a growing number of jurisdictions 32 have now abandoned
the traditional "public policy" rule, and have adopted the modem
approach that divorce-planning in antenuptial agreements is not
invalid per se; and, thus, parties contemplating marriage might
legally draft provisions in an antenuptial agreement covering the
possibility of an unwanted, but statistically probable, marriage
breakdown which could conceivably end in divorce.33
29. Id.
30. In re Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal.3d 342, 551 P.2d 323, 133 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1976),
disapproving, In re Marriage of Higgason, 10 Cal.2d 476, 516 P.2d 289, 110 Cal. Rptr. 897
(1973).
31. 233 So.2d 381 (Fla. 1970), quashed on other grounds, 257 So.2d 530 (Fla. 1972).
32. In re Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal.3d 342, 551 P.2d 323, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1976),
disapproving, In re Marriage of Higgason, 10 Cal.3d 476, 516 P.2d 289, 110 Cal. Rptr. 897
(1973); Parniawski v. Parniawski, 33 Conn. Sup. 44, 359 A.2d 719 (1976); Belcher v. Belcher,
271 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1972) and 307 So.2d 918 (Fla. 1975); Volid v. Volid, 6 Ill. App.3d 386, 286
N.E.2d 42 (1972); Krejci v. Krejci, 191 Neb. 698, 217 N.W.2d 470 (1974) (semble); Buettner
v. Buettner, 89 Nev. 39, 505 P.2d 600 (1973); Hudson v. Hudson, 350 P.2d 596 (Okla. 1960);
Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 506 P.2d 719 (1973), over-ruling in part, Reiling v. Reiling,
256 Or. 448, 474 P.2d 327 (1970).
33. The year number of divorces in the United States has increased from 428,000 in 1963
to over 900,000 in 1973. (By 1977 there were over 1 million divorces a year in the United
1979]
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The validity of such an antenuptial provision would be based on
the parties' objective intent and, so long as the agreement itself did
not "promote" divorce or separation, the parties could contractually
determine their various property and support contingencies upon
divorce.34
The Posner court expressed the social policy behind the modem
approach in this way:
There can be no doubt that the institution of marriage is the foun-
dation of the familial and social structure of our Nation and, as such,
continues to be of vital interest to the State; but we cannot blind
ourselves to the fact that the concept of the "sanctity" of a mar-
riage-as being practically indissoluble, once entered into-held by
our ancestors only a few generations ago, has been greatly eroded in
the last several decades. This court can take judicial notice of the fact
that the ratio of marriages to divorces has reached a disturbing rate
in many states; and that a new concept of divorce-in which there is
no "guilty" party-is being advocated by many groups and has been
adopted by the State of California in a recent revision of its divorce
laws providing for dissolution of a marriage upon pleading and proof
of "irreconcilable differences" between the parties, without assessing
the fault for the failure of the marriage against either party.
With divorce such a commonplace fact of life, it is fair to assume
that many prospective marriage partners whose property and familial
situation is such as to generate a valid antenuptial agreement settling
their property rights upon the death of either, might want to consider
and discuss also-and agree upon, if possible-the disposition of their
property and the alimony rights of the wife in the event their mar-
riage, despite their best efforts, should fail. 5
Cognizant of the traditional "public policy" rule against divorce-
States.) The divorce rate per 1,000 population increased from 2.5 in 1965 to 4.4 in 1973. U.S.
Dept. of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 51 (1974).
34. See note 7 supra.
35. 233 So.2d at 384. Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that the high rate of divorce
in America today is not directly related to these "easier" divorce laws. See RHINsTEN,
MARRIAGE, STABILITY, AND THE LAW 306 (1972); Lee, Divorce Reform in Michigan, 5 J. LAW
REF. 409 (1972), quoted in H. CLARK, CASES AND PROBLEMS IN DoMEsTc RELATIONS (1974),
where Clark concludes on p. 683 ". . . it is important to remember that no evidence has ever
been found that liberal grounds for divorce produce unstable marriages or that a strict divorce
law pievents or reduces the breakdown of marriages." This is important to remember as it
affects antenuptial agreements with divorce-planning contingencies.
[Vol. 13:175
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planning contingencies in antenuptial agreements, " the Posner
court argued that this subjective test could also apply to defeat the
marriage, as well as uphold it, and thus "have the same meretri-
cious effect insofar as the public policy in question is concerned. '37
The court continued:
[Ilt is not inconceivable [under the traditional rule] that a dissatis-
fied wife-secure in the knowledge that the provisions for alimony
contained in the antenuptial agreement could not be enforced against
her . . . might provoke her husband into divorcing her in order to
collect a large alimony check every month, or a lump-sum award
:38
So contingent divorce-planning provisions in an antenuptial
agreement, the Posner court concluded, must now be tested by the
objective intent of the parties themselves.
We have given careful consideration to the question of whether the
change in public policy towards divorce requires a change in the rule
respecting antenuptial agreements settling alimony and property
rights of the parties upon divorce and have concluded that such
agreements should no longer be held to be void ab initio as "contrary
to public policy." If . . it is made to appear that the divorce was
prosecuted in good faith, on proper grounds, so that, under the rules
applicable to postnuptial alimony and property settlement agree-
ments. . . it could not be said to facilitate or promote the procure-
ment of a divorce, then it should be held valid as to conditions exist-
ing at the time the agreement was made.39
Another example of the modern approach regarding divorce-
planning in antenuptial agreements is In re Marriage of Dawley."'
Here, the California Supreme Court held that an antenuptial agree-
36. The Posner court cited 57 A.L.R.2d 942 et seq where such divorce contingency provi-
sions were said to "facilitate or promote the procurement of a divorce" and quoted from
Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn. App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288 (1964): "Such [a] contract could
induce a mercenary husband to inflict on his wife any wrong he might desire with the
knowledge [that] his pecuniary liability would be limited." 233 So.2d at 383.
37. Id. at 383-84.
38. Id. at 383.
39. Id. at 385.
40. 17 Cal.3d 342, 551 P.2d 323, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1976), disapproving, In re Marriage of
Higgason, 10 Cal.3d 476, 516 P.2d 289, 110 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1973).
1979]
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ment is valid, even though the uncontested facts were that both
parties had anticipated an early dissolution of their marriage.'
In this case, Betty and James had "maintained an intimate rela-
tionship 42 for three years, at which time Betty discovered that she
was pregnant. Betty, a tenured elementary school teacher, told
James that she feared a non-marital pregnancy would result in the
loss of her teaching job. James refused to marry Betty, and she then
threatened a paternity suit with publicity against James to imperil
his employment. Finally, both parties agreed to a temporary mar-
riage as a solution to their mutual dilemma, and agreed to protect
their respective property and support interests through an antenup-
tial agreement.13
In the antenuptial agreement, both parties disclaimed all rights
in the property of the other, including community property rights
that would ordinarily devolve upon marriage. James further agreed
to support Betty and her child by a former relationship "for the
minimum period of fourteen calendar months following said mar-
riage in order that [Betty] may take a leave of absence from the
teaching profession."44 James also agreed to support any child born
to Betty and James until that child reached the age of majority.
In fact, this "temporary" marriage lasted much longer than the
contemplated fourteen months-seven years to be exact-before
James and Betty filed for the dissolution of their marriage. The trial
court granted dissolution of the marriage based upon "irreconcilable
differences" and granted Betty spousal support of $1 per year, cus-
tody of Lisa (the parties' child), child support of $300 a month, and
attorneys' fees. Relying on the antenuptial agreement, the court
found no community property to divide in the dissolution proceed-
ings, and Betty appealed, arguing that their antenuptial agreement
was void ab initio since it contemplated divorce."
Although the California Supreme Court could not enforce ali-
mony provisions in the antenuptial agreement, as the Posner court
had done, since this was barred in California by statute," the court,
41. 131 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
42. Id. at 5.
43. Id. at 5-7.
44. Id. at 6.
45. Id. at 6-7.
46. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4802 (West; 1970). One might argue that since § 4802 refers to
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nevertheless, over-ruled earlier precedent,47 and held that divorce-
planning in antenuptial agreements concerning the parties' prop-
erty rights was indeed valid.
In upholding the divorce-planning provisions of the Dawley's an-
tenuptial agreement, the court re-emphasized the modern approach
that the analysis of antenuptial agreements should be confined to
the objective terms of the agreement itself when it stated that,
"California courts have uniformly held that contracts offend the
state policy favoring marriage only insofar as the terms of the
contract 'facilitate' 'encourage,' or 'promote' divorce or dissolu-
tion.""
Another example of the modern approach that divorce-planning
in antenuptial agreements is valid, but with an interesting twist, is
the Nevada decision of Buettner v. Buettner."
In this case, prior to their marriage, John and Stella signed an
antenuptial agreement providing that in the event of divorce, in
release of all rights and claims against John's real or personal prop-
erty, including spousal support, Stella would receive the parties'
marital dwelling and household furnishings, and the sum of $500 per
month for a period of five years, for a total amount of $30,000. The
antenuptial agreement also provided that upon divorce, these provi-
"husband and wife," the section is confined to postnuptial agreements instead of antenuptial
agreements, but this statute needs further judicial clarification or legislative modification.
See Branca v. Steinberg, Antenuptial Agreements Under California Law 11 U.S.F.L. Rv.
317, 328-40 (1977).
47. In re Marriage of Higgason, 10 Cal. 3d 476, 516 P.2d 289, 110 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1973).
The court stated that the dictum in Higgason, that antenuptial agreements must be made
in contemplation that the marriage will continue "until the parties are separated by death,"
was an inaccurate statement of California law. In re Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal.3d 342, 551
P.2d 323, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3, 8 (1976). See also LINDEY § 90-18 for other supporting authority.
48. In re Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal. 3d 342, 551 P.2d 323, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3, 8 (1976)
(emphasis added). The court in a footnote narrowed this objective test even further:
Although the cited cases assert that an agreement which "facilitates" dissolution
violates public policy, this terminology is misleading. In a literal sense, any contract
which delimits the property rights of the spouses might "facilitate" dissolution by
making possible a shorter and less expensive dissolution hearing. But public policy
does not render property agreements unenforceable merely because such agreements
simplify the division of marital property; it is only when the agreement encourages or
promotes dissolution that it offends the public policy to foster and protect marriage.
Id. at 8, n. 5.
49. 89 Nev. 39, 505 P.2d 600 (1973).
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sions were binding upon John, whether or not Stella later remar-
ried ?o
The facts further indicated that both parties had been previously
married and had children by prior marriages, and that John's sepa-
rate property at the time of the antenuptial agreement was esti-
mated by him to be worth approximately $400,000." '
One year later the parties sued for divorce, and Stella petitioned
the trial court judge that should a divorce be granted, the related
property settlement and support provisions should conform with the
parties' antenuptial agreement. The trial court disagreed and, fol-
lowing the traditional "public policy" rule, held that their "Pre-
Marital Agreement . . .was made in derogation of marriage, is
contrary to public policy and is therefore void. ' '. 2 Stella appealed to
the Nevada Supreme Court, which reversed the lower court deci-
sion.
In its decision, adopting the modern approach toward divorce-
planning provisions in antenuptial agreements, the Buettner court
demonstrated an objective analysis toward the facts of this particu-
lar case:
While in the normal case the wife urges the invalidity of the con-
tract, here, the husband, using a strange twist on the above rationale,
argues that the contractual provision relating to the property settle-
ment and support was so generous in favor of the wife that she was
induced by the hope of financial gain to so abuse and mistreat her
husband as to force him to bring an action for divorce.
We are unconvinced. We do not find, nor did the trial court find,
that the prospective wife entered into the contract with the intent to
obtain a divorce from Mr. Buettner and thereby profit financially.
There was no finding that the wife caused the divorce . . . .This
case, then, does not stand on the same footing as those wherein cer-
tain types of antenuptial contracts are said to be violative of public
policy because they induce, encourage or promote divorce.
Quoting the public policy rationale of the Posner case with ap-
50. Id. at 601.
51. Id. at 602.
52. Id. at 602.
53. Id. at 603.
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proval,5' the Buettner court supported this objective test regarding
divorce-planning contingencies in antenuptial agreements, and fur-
ther stressed an inherent judicial review to guard against any possi-
ble contractual abuses:
We have given careful consideration to whether antenuptial con-
tracts settling alimony and property rights upon divorce are to be
viewed in this state as void because contrary to public policy, and
hold that they are not. Nevertheless, as with all contracts, courts of
this state shall retain power to refuse to enforce a particular antenup-
tial contract if it is found that it is unconscionable, obtained through
fraud, misrepresentation, material nondisclosure, or duress. '
It had thus taken judicial precedent over half a century to recog-
nize the fact that divorce-planning contingencies in antenuptial
agreements should be analyzed by, and confined to, the objective
terms of the contract itself, rather than being analyzed by some
highly subjective and often misapplied "public policy" argument.
III. Is ALIMONY-OR SPOUSAL SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE-OF SUCH
PUBLIC IMPORTANCE THAT IT CANNOT BE LEFT TO THE PARTIES' PRIVATE
CONTRACTUAL CONTROL IN AN ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENT?
In addition to the .traditional "public policy" rule that divorce-
planning contingencies in antenuptial agreements might "promote"
or "facilitate" divorce, 5 a second "public policy" argument has
been espoused by some courts to invalidate such divorce-planning
provisions. Briefly stated, this second rule is that the essential mari-
tal obligation of adequate spousal support is of such public import-
ance that it should not be left to the parties' private contractual
control in an antenuptial agreement.
As one court has stated this principle:
There are three parties to a marriage contract-the husband, the
wife, and the state. The husband and wife are presumed to have, and
54. Id. at 603-04. See also the discussion related to note 34 supra; Volid v. Volid, 6 Ill. App.
3d 386, 286 N.E.2d 42, 47 (1972) ("The reasons given to justify the invalidation of all antenup-
tial agreements which limit the obligation of support upon divorce do not warrant the con-
demnation of all such agreements in the name of public policy."); Parniawski v. Parniawski,
33 Conn. Sup. 44, 359 A.2d 719 (1976).
55. Buettner v. Buettner, 89 Nev. 39, 505 P.2d 600, 604 (1973).
56. See notes 6-55 supra, and accompanying text.
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the state unquestionably has an interest in the maintenance of the
relation which for centuries has been recognized as a bulwark of our
civilization. That unusual conditions have caused a marked increase
in the divorce rate does not require us to change our attitude toward
the marital relation and its obligations, nor should it encourage the
growth of a tendency to treat it as a bargain made with as little
concern and dignity as is given to the ordinary contract . . . . [Sol
husband and wife may contract with each other before marriage as
to their mutual property rights, but they cannot vary the personal
duties and obligations to each other which result from the marriage
contract itself.57
Here then is the second subjective "public policy" rule that would
reject any divorce-planning contingencies in antenuptial agree-
ments as void per se, and another "public policy" rule that is not
entirely accurate.8 Nevertheless, this rule is still followed by various
courts, and must be tested against an objective alternative, if any.
Accordingly, two interdependent arguments may be raised to
question this second "public policy" approach: (1) The general rule
is that parties may privately contract to vary, limit, or extinguish
their respective property rights and alimony obligations in a separa-
tion agreement, prior to divorce, without state interference. Why
then shouldn't the parties be able to contract in a similar manner
with antenuptial agreements; and (2) Antenuptial agreements re-
garding the various property rights of the parties are usually upheld,
even when divorce is contemplated, if the agreement is fair to the
parties, or there is full disclosure of the parties' worth. Why
shouldn't this objective test apply equally well as to alimony
provisions in an antenuptial agreement?
57. Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124, 42 N.W.2d 500, 501-02 (1950) (quoting in part from Ryan
v. Dockery 134 Wis. 431, 434, 114 N.W. 820, 821). See also In re Marriage of Gudenkauf, 204
N.W.2d 586 (Iowa, 1973) ("The other basis for the [public policy] rule is the principle that
the interspousal support obligation is imposed by law and cannot be contracted away." Id.
at 587); Reiling v. Reiling, 256 Or. 448, 474 P.2d 327, 328 (1970) ("[Tlhe state has a para-
mount interest in the adequate support of its citizens, and, therefore, the husband's duty of
support, either before or after divorce, should not be left to private control." Id. at 328.).
58. "This [rule] is not so widely or strongly applied as it used to be, as shown by the
modem courts' hospitality toward separation agreements. It does still have application to
many kinds of agreements, however." CLARK, supra note 1, at 29 n. 18.
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A. The Analogy Between Separation Agreements and Antenuptial
Agreements
Although an extensive discussion of the legal aspects of separation
agreements related to divorce is beyond the scope of this article,",
there are still some striking similarities regarding the contractual
rights of the parties in drafting divorce-planning provisions in sepa-
ration agreements that might also have the same applicability in
antenuptial agreements.
First, a separation agreement, if fairly made, "is binding in vir-
tually all jurisdictions that permit parties to contract with each
other." " Like antenuptial agreements, a separation agreement is
valid and favored by law if the contract itself does not "encourage"
or "promote" divorce or separation.' However, the parties in a sepa-
ration agreement in contemplation of divorce, but not conducive to
it, may also settle, by private contract, not only their property
rights, but also spousal support provisions.2 Antenuptial agree-
ments are also valid and favored by law regarding the disposition
of certain property rights, 3 but under the traditional view the par-
ties in an antenuptial agreement cannot determine any spousal sup-
port provisions. "4 Why this difference between separation agree-
ments and antenuptial agreements?
The answer, in large part, appears to be one of timing. In a separa-
tion agreement, the separation has already occurred, or occurs im-
mediately after the making of the agreement. 5 The parties contem-
plating divorce in a separation agreement may therefore realistically
59. But see, regarding separation agreements, LINDEY, supra note 1, at § 31; CLARK, supra
note 1, at 521-66; Wilson, Property Settlement Agreements 14 S. CAL. L. RE v. 373 (1941);
Comment, Divorce Agreements: Independent Contract or Incorporation in Decree 20 U. Cm.
L. REV. 138 (1952); Clark, Separation Agreements 28 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 149 (1956).
60. See LINDEY, supra note 1, at § 31-56; CLARK, supra note 1, at 521-523.
61. See, e.g., Beverly v. Beverly, 290 Ga. 468, 74 S.E.2d 89 (1953); Nogle v. Nogle, 53 Ill.
App. 2d 457, 202 N.E.2d 683 (1964).
62. See LNDEY, supra note 1, at § 31-18 to -24; CLARK, supra note 1, at 548-53. See, e.g.,
Wife B.T.L. v. Husband H.A.L., 287 A.2d 413 (Del. 1972); Catron v. Catron, 492 S.W.2d 172
(Mo. 1973); Marson v. Marson, 6 N.Y.2d 925, 161 N.E.2d 212 (1959); Capps v. Capps, 216
Va. 378, 219 S.E.2d 901 (1975).
63. See LINDEY supra note 1, at § 90-25; CLARK, supra note 1, at 27. See, e.g., Del Vecchio
v. Del Vecchio, 143 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1962); In re Kaufmann's Estate, 404 Pa. 131, 171 A.2d 48
(1961); Batleman v. Rubin, 199 Va. 156, 98 S.E.2d 519 (1957).
64. See notes 1-5 supra, and accompanying text.
65. See CLARK, supra note 1, at 521.
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ascertain, and provide for, their immediate and future needs and
obligations. But in an antenuptial agreement, it has been argued,
spousal support requirements at a later date may be unknown or
inadequate.
The real reason for invalidating such antenuptial contracts seems to
be that although the [spousal support] provisions may be fair at the
time they are made, they may not be later when the separation or
divorce occurs. The wife may thus be left with entirely inadequate
support, or the husband with an excessively heavy liability to his wife
[or vice versa] ..... Thus, the difficulty of forecasting the parties'
circumstances so far in the future has led the courts to disallow an-
tenuptial contracts which attempt to do this with respect to support
66
Yet, although spousal support "as an essential obligation of the
marital relation" 7 may have "greater significance than property
rights, "8 this traditional subjective concern of what "may" happen
has again led many courts to declare antenuptial spousal support
provisions are void per se when, in fact, there already exists an
objective legal safeguard to determine the validity or invalidity of
these provisions using a case-by-case analysis.
What is this legal safeguard? With analogous separation agree-
ments, where spousal support provisions may be validly fixed, lim-
ited, or relinquished by the parties themselves, the courts still retain
the right to review these contracts and objectively determine
whether or not the support provisions are fair to the parties; and if
such provisions are determined to be unfair, the court is not re-
quired to recognize the agreement. 9 So, also, the court can retain
66. Reiling v. Reiling, 256 Or. 448, 474 P.2d 327, 328 (1970), quoting, CIAK, supra note 1,
at 28-9 (1968) (emphasis added). An argument can be made that judicial concern behind this
"public policy" rule of adequate support for the -wife may not be as important today as it
might have been in the past, due to the greater influx of married women into the national
labor force. In 1940, married women were only 36.4% of the female labor force, but by 1973
they constituted over 63% of that labor market. In 1950, only 23.8% of tll married women
were in the national labor force, but by 1973 40% of all married women were in the labor force.
(Current estimates today are that approximately 50% of all married women are currently
employed.) U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United Sates 340-41 (1974)
citing U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
67. 474 P.2d at 328, quoting, CLARK, supra note 1, at §§ 28, 29.
68. Id.; But see note 73.
69. The power of the divorce court and the extent of judicial review over separation agree-
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judicial control over antenuptial support provisions, based on an
objective case-by-case analysis of each agreement, rather than void-
ing all such agreements per se.
B. The Law of Antenuptial Agreements Already Provides an
Objective Safeguard in Determining the Validity or Non-Validity
of Spousal Support Provisions Upon Divorce
In addition to the argument that judicial review of separation
agreements should apply equally well to antenuptial agreements
regarding provisions for alimony or spousal support, another argu-
ment can also be made: that the law of antenuptial agreements
already provides an objective safeguard in determining the validity
or non-validity of spousal support provisions in an antenuptial
agreement without having to void all such provisions ab initio. The
second objective safeguard is this:
To render an antenuptial agreement valid, there must be a fair and
reasonable provision therein for the wife [or husbandi, or-in the
absence of such provision-there must be full and frank disclosure to
her of the husband's worth before she signs the agreement, and she
must sign freely and voluntarily, on competent independent advice,
and with full knowledge of her rights25
If, traditionally, this antenuptial rule has applied to certain prop-
erty rights,7' most courts following the modem approach have also
ments-specifically concerning spousal support provisions-differs widely from state to state.
Some courts, probably a majority, hold that the divorce court is not necessarily bound by
the parties' separation agreement with regard to spousal support, and the court may recognize
the agreement's support provisions, or award support as it sees fit, on a case-by-case ap-
proach. Other courts hold that the terms of a separation agreement must be approved by the
divorce court in the absence of fraud, duress, or a breach of some confidential relationship
between the spouses. Professor Clark feels this is the more desirable approach in order to allow
the parties to make their own financial arrangements.
See LINDEY, supra note 1, at § 31-55 et seq; CLARK, supra note 1, at 548-53; and authority
cited therein.
70. Batleman v. Rubin, 199 Va. 156, 98 S.E.2d 519, 521 (1957), quoting, LINDEY, supra note
1, at § 90. See also Norrell v. Thompson, 252 Ala. 603, 42 So.2d 461 (1949); Del Vecchio v.
Del Vecchio, 143 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1962); Plant v. Plant, 320 So.2d 455 (Fla. App. 1975); In re
Estate of West, 194 Kan. 736, 402 P.2d 117 (1965); In re Estate of Spieth, 181 Neb. 11, 146
N.W.2d 746 (1966); In re Estate of Kaufman's, 404 Pa. 131, 171 A.2d 48 (1961); Schutterle v.
Schutterle, 260 N.W.2d 341 (S.D. 1977); Hamlin v. Merlino, 44 Wash.2d 851, 272 P.2d 125
(1954); Friedlander v. Friedlander, 80 Wash.2d 293, 494 P.2d 208 (1972); LINDEY, supra note
1, at § 90-36; CLARK, supra note 1, at 30.
71. See LINDEY, supra note 1, at § 90-36 and authorities cited in note 70. See also the
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applied a similar rule to alimony or spousal support provisions in
antenuptial agreements 72-especially since division of property
often performs essentially the same function as alimony, and may
also be given in lieu of alimony."3
Using this rule, an objective case-by-case evaluation can be made,
and alimony or spousal support provisions in ante-nuptial agree-
ments will be upheld by the court if "fair" or was made with "full
disclosure"; otherwise, like separation agreements, the provisions
can be modified under the court's power of judicial review.- As the
Oregon Supreme Court has stated this principle:
We have now come to the conclusion that antenuptial agreements
concerning alimony should be enforced unless enforcement deprives
a spouse of support that he or she cannot otherwise secure. A provi-
sion providing that no alimony shall be paid will be enforced unless
the spouse has no other reasonable source of support.
If the circumstances of the parties change, the court can modify the
decree just as it can modify a decree based upon an agreement made
in contemplation of divorce which has a provision regarding payment
of support.'
In this manner, an objective test involving fairness, full disclo-
sure, and judicial modification if necessary, will permit, and pro-
following traditional examples of antenuptial agreements where the court upheld the parties'
property division upon divorce as valid: Dingledine v. Dingledine, 52:3 S.W.2d 189 (Ark.
1975); In re Marriage of Higgason, 10 Cal.3d 476, 516 P.2d 289, 110 Cl. Rptr. 897 (1973);
Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 368 F.Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 503 F.2d 1397 (2d Cir. 1973);
Dearbaugh v. Dearbaugh, 110 Ohio App. 540, 170 N.E.2d 262 (1959); Freeman v. Freeman,
565 P.2d 365 (Okla. 1977); Englund v. Englund, 175 N.W.2d 461 (Minn. 1970); Capps v.
Capps, 216 Va. 378, 219 S.E.2d 901 (1975) (semble).
72. See, e.g., Belcher v. Belcher, 271 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1972); Belcher v. Belcher, 307 So.2d 918
(Fla. 1975); Volid v. Volid, 6 Ill. App. 3d 386, 286 N.E.2d 42 (1972); Buettner v. Buettner, 89
Nev. 39, 505 P.2d 600 (1973); Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 506 P.2d 719 (1973).
73. "It is argued . . . that very often the property division decreed by the divorce court
performs essentially the same function as alimony. If so, any antenuptial agreement concern-
ing the disposition of the parties' property on divorce should share the same fate as the
agreement concerning support." CLARK, supra note 1, at 29. (footnotes omitted). See also Id.
at 449-52, and authority cited therein.
74. Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 506 P.2d 719, 721 (1973). In a related footnote, the
court added: "The antenuptial agreement, of course, must be valid in other respects, particu-
larly it must have been fairly entered into by spouses who have a fiduciary duty to each other
which includes a duty of full disclosure of assets." Id. at 721 n. 2.
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tect, realistic divorce-planning contingencies in antenuptial agree-
ments from a subjective possibility of judicial overkill.
IV. CONCLUSION
The traditional "public policy" rule that divorce-planning in an-
tenuptial agreements is void because this tends to "promote" and
"encourage" divorce, or because alimony or spousal support has
"greater significance" than property rights, has often been subjec-
tively misinterpreted and misapplied by the courts.
A realistic antenuptial agreement should be able to incorporate
certain divorce-planning contingencies, and courts following this
modem approach will uphold such provisions under an objective
test, ascertaining the parties' actual intent and the agreement's
fairness through established judicial review.
Legal practioners should be encouraged to draft suitable divorce-
planning contingency provisions in their clients' antenuptial agree-
ment, but with the caveat that until more jurisdictions recognize
the modem approach to divorce-planning in antenuptial contracts,
the practitioner would also be wise to incorporate a severability
clause into this agreement.
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